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Summary
Congress enacts expedited, or fast-track, procedures into law when it wants to
increase the likelihood that one or both houses of Congress will vote in a timely way
on a certain measure or kind of measure.  These procedures are enacted as rule-
making provisions of law pursuant to the constitutional power of each house to adopt
its own rules.  The house to which a set of expedited procedures applies may act
unilaterally to waive, suspend, amend, or repeal them.
Sets of expedited procedures, as they affect the House of Representatives, can
have as many as eight components.  These components address the definition of the
measure to which the procedures apply, the measure’s introduction and its referral,
its consideration in committee, the priority the measure enjoys for House floor
consideration, the process of debating and amending it on the floor, and coordination
with the Senate.
There are variations with respect to each of these components among the fast-
track procedures now in force that can affect the legislative process in the House.
Some of these variations can make it considerably more or less likely that the
measures to which these procedures apply can progress through most or all stages of
the House’s legislative process within the time limits specified by law.  For example,
some expedited procedures place a time limit on House committee consideration of
any measures subject to which those procedures.  Such a time limit ensures that the
measures cannot be kept from the House floor because the committee to which they
were referred chooses not to report them.  Also of particular importance is whether
or not fast-track procedures permit the measures in question to be amended.
Allowing any amendments to be offered to a measure creates the possibility of a
disagreement with the Senate that can delay or prevent the measure’s enactment.
Most sets of expedited procedures are incomplete in that they do not ensure that,
if an eligible measure enjoys majority support in both houses, those majorities will be
able to move the measure through the various stages of the legislative process, in
committee and on the floor, and present it to the President within the time period
permitted by law.  However, such incomplete procedures are not necessarily
defective.  The House may deliberately choose to adopt fast-track procedures that
preserve the usual discretion of its committees as well as the ability of its majority
party leaders to control the House’s floor agenda.
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1U.S. House of Representatives. Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual and Rules of the House
of Representatives of the United States, 106th Congress.  House Document No. 105-358;
105th Congress, 2nd Session; 1999; pp. 1033-1034.  (Hereafter cited as the House Rules and
Manual.)  
2See, for example, House Rules and Manual, pp. 1044-1045.
3These measures are referred to here as eligible measures, in that they are eligible for
consideration under the expedited procedures.
Expedited Procedures in the House:
Variations Enacted Into Law
The Nature and Effects of Expedited Procedures
Expedited procedures, also known as “fast-track” procedures, are enacted into
law to increase the likelihood that one or both houses of Congress will vote in a
timely way on a certain measure or kind of measure.  
These procedures are enacted into law as what are sometimes called rule-making
provisions of law.  They are given this designation because Congress enacts them
pursuant to the constitutional authority of each house to write its own rules.  Even
though expedited procedures are included in laws, they have the same force and effect
as the standing rules that either house adopts by simple House or Senate resolution
to govern its own organization and procedure.1  The house to which a set of
expedited procedures applies may act unilaterally to waive, suspend, amend, or repeal
them, without the concurrence of the other house or the President.  The House of
Representatives also may agree to a special rule, reported by the House Rules
Committee, that supersedes some or all of the elements that are included in a set of
expedited procedures.2
Most measures that Representatives and Senators introduce every two years do
not survive all the stages of the legislative process, for lack of time or political support
or both.  This result is generally accepted as an unavoidable and desirable
characteristic of how Congress does its business.  From time to time, however,
Congress has decided in advance that it will be important for one or both houses to
have an opportunity to act within a limited period of time on a certain bill or
resolution or on a certain kind of measure.  In those cases, Congress has enacted
special procedures that apply only to those measures and that are intended to put
them on a legislative fast track–to expedite their progress through some or all of the
stages of the legislative process.3
These procedures are most likely to be enacted when Congress delegates to the
President or another executive branch official the authority to issue a regulation or
take some other action.  As part of this delegation of authority, Congress may reserve
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the right to pass its own judgment on the proposed regulation or action by passing a
joint resolution to approve or disapprove it before it takes effect.  To facilitate action
on such a joint resolution, Congress may write into law special procedures for
considering it.  However, these special expedited procedures are available only for a
limited period of time.  Thereafter, Congress still can pass a joint resolution of
approval or disapproval, but it must do so under its regular legislative procedures.
Well-known examples of fast-track procedures are those appearing in the War
Powers Act and the Trade Act of 1974, as amended.  Congress also has enacted the
same kinds of procedures in other circumstances in which it chose to decide in
advance how it would consider certain measures.  The best known examples probably
are the expedited procedures in the Congressional Budget Act, as amended, that
govern House and Senate floor consideration of budget resolutions and reconciliation
bills. 
The general nature and characteristics of expedited procedures are discussed in
the CRS report on “Fast-Track” or Expedited Procedures: Their Purposes,
Elements, and Implications (Report 98-888).  That report is concerned primarily with
what different sets of expedited procedures have in common, and how those common
characteristics differ from the regular legislative process in the House and Senate.
This complementary report focuses more on the differences among various sets of
expedited procedures that have been enacted into law and remain in force.  This
report is concerned only with fast-track procedures affecting the House of
Representatives; it does not address such procedures as they affect the legislative
process in the Senate.
Components of Expedited Procedures
Not all expedited procedures are the same.  Some sets of these procedures
include provisions on certain subjects that other sets of fast-track procedures do not
address at all.  Even when different sets of expedited procedures address the same
subject, they do not always deal with that subject in the same way.  In some cases, the
practical consequences of these differences are minimal.  In other cases, there are
important differences in how much assurance expedited procedures offer Members
that they will be able to cast timely votes on whether to pass or defeat the measures
to which those procedures apply.    
Sets of expedited procedures can have as many as eight components, addressing
the following subjects and questions (from the perspective of the House): 
1.  Definition.  How does the statute define the measure or measures to which
the expedited procedures apply? 
2.  Introduction.  Does the statute provide for automatic, mandatory, or
discretionary introduction of the measure (or each of the measures) to which the
expedited procedures apply?
CRS-3
4House Rules and Manual, pp. 1031-1159.
5One exception is the fast-track procedures for acting on budget resolutions and reconciliation
bills.  These are included in a separate compilation of budget process provisions of law that
is printed in the immediately preceding section of the House Rules and Manual.  (However,
the provisions of Title X of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, on
rescissions and deferrals, are included among the expedited procedures.)  Also, the fast-track
procedures of the Line Item Veto Act remain in law but are not included in the compilation
because the Supreme Court has declared that act to be unconstitutional.  On the other hand,
the compilation reprints the expedited procedures governing plans to reorganize the executive
branch, even though the legal authority to implement those procedures lapsed at the end of
1984.  The House parliamentarian explains that  “[t]hese provisions are carried in this
compilation because other Acts have incorporated their procedures by reference.” House
Rules and Manual, p. 1041.  Similarly, the compilation contains the expedited procedures in
the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, even though the Secretary of Defense
does not presently have the authority to make recommendations that could eventually be
subject to those procedures.  Finally, the compilation includes some expedited procedures for
(continued...)
3.  Referral.  Does the statute govern referral of each eligible measure to
committee?
4.  Committee consideration.  Does the statute ensure that the committee to
which the measure is referred cannot kill it by inaction?
5.  Priority for floor consideration.  Does the statute make the measure
privileged for House floor consideration?
6.  House floor debate.  Does the statute impose a time limit on how long the
House may debate the measure, if and when it is called up for consideration?
7.  House floor amendments.  Does the statute bar or restrict floor amendments
to the measure?
8.  Coordination with the Senate.  Does the statute include provisions
governing House action on a Senate measure that the Senate passes under its
corresponding expedited procedures?
There are several different ways in which expedited procedures can address each
of these questions.  Alternatively, fast-track procedures may fail to address one or
more of these questions in any way.
Variations Enacted Into Law
We can identify varieties of expedited procedures that Congress has enacted by
examining those provisions that are reprinted in the section of the House Rules and
Manual on “‘Congressional Disapproval’ Provisions Contained in Public Laws.”4 This
compilation includes, with several exceptions, all fast-track procedures affecting the
House that have been enacted into law and that remain in force.5  Examining how
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5(...continued)
considering either simple House resolutions or concurrent resolutions, the constitutional force
of which may be in doubt in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983).  Excluded from the compilation are any fast-track procedures that apply only to
the Senate, not to the House.
6This counts each set of expedited procedures written into law and reprinted in the House
Rules and Manual, regardless of whether the law makes those procedures applicable to one
measure, one kind of measure, or several different kinds of measures.  It also counts
provisions of a law that make a measure or certain measures subject to a set of expedited
procedures that are identified as having previously been enacted into law.  Because there are
different (and defensible) ways in which these procedures could be counted, not too much
weight should be given to the precise numbers and percentages given in this report.  For
example, one law may include a single set of fast-track procedures and make them applicable
to different measures that are defined in various other sections of the statute.  Another law,
on the other hand, may include the expedited procedures that are applicable to each of several
measures, even though all those sets of procedures are identical.
7All references to, and quotations from, specific laws derive from the excerpts from those laws
that are reprinted in the House Rules and Manual.
these various procedures address each of the eight issues listed above reveals how sets
of expedited procedures can and do differ, especially in the assurance they provide
that a majority of Representatives can act, within the limited time available under the
statute in question, on the measures that have been placed on the legislative fast track.
Definition
The first question that can arise in comparing different sets of expedited
procedures is how each set of procedures identifies the bills or resolutions to which
it applies.  Each set of fast-track procedures is available for considering one or more
specific measures or kinds of measures.  Does the statute leave any ambiguity about
the measures to which its expedited procedures apply?
The House Rules and Manual for the 106th Congress contains 48 sets of
expedited procedures.6  Half of them avoid definitional ambiguity by including in the
law the exact text of each measure that can be considered under the expedited
procedures the law creates.  (This text usually includes one or more blanks to be filled
in so as to identify the regulation or other matter to be approved or disapproved.)  For
example, the Pension Reform Act  includes expedited procedures to consider certain
resolutions, and states that, for this purpose:7
‘resolution’ means only a joint resolution, the matter after the resolving
clauses of which is as follows: “The proposed revised schedule transmitted
to Congress by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation on ________ is
hereby approved,” the blank space therein being filled with the date on
which the corporation’s message proposing the rate was delivered. 
It may be possible to define the content of a measure with clarity and precision
but without actually presenting its text.  However, failing to include the actual text of
the measure may create uncertainty as to whether a specific measure does or does not
CRS-5
8Another statute, the Federal Salary Act of 1967, applies expedited procedures to a bill or
joint resolution only if the measure is introduced by the majority leader of the House or
Senate.
qualify for consideration under expedited procedures.  For example, the Marine
Fisheries Conservation Act creates fast-track procedures for considering a “fishery
agreement resolution,” defined as a resolution “the effect of which is to prohibit the
entering into force and effect of any governing international fishery agreement,
bycatch reduction agreement, or Pacific Insular Area fishery agreement the text of
which is transmitted to the Congress pursuant to subsection (a)....”  (Italics added.)
The potential problem arises because of the phrase “the effect of which”;   that phrase
could be interpreted to encompass any resolution that arguably would have the
indirect effect of making it impossible, perhaps for political or economic reasons, for
the United States to enter into an international fishery agreement.
Similarly, Section 204 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to implement presidential recommendations
with respect to certain public lands unless the House and Senate agree, within a 90-
day period, to a concurrent resolution “indicating otherwise.”  The statute is silent as
to what kinds of provisions in a concurrent resolution would qualify as “indicating
otherwise.”
Should there be disagreement as to whether a particular measure qualifies for
consideration under expedited procedures, the Speaker presumably would resolve the
question in ruling on a point of order or in deciding whether to recognize a Member
for the purpose of invoking those procedures.  The need for such determinations can
be minimized by including in each law establishing expedited procedures as clear and
precise a definition as possible of the measures to which those procedures are to
apply.
Introduction
Most expedited procedures apply to certain measures, however defined, only if
Members choose to introduce those measures.  In 43 of the 48 sets of procedures
found in the House Rules and Manual, the statute allows any Member to introduce
the measure or presumes that a Member will do so.8  In only four of the 48 instances
do the fast-track procedures require that a measure be introduced.  One of these
exceptions is in Section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 which provides that bills
implementing trade agreements are to be introduced (by request) by the majority and
minority leaders of the House and Senate or their designees.  The nuclear non-
proliferation provisions of the Atomic Energy Act (Sec. 130) mandate introduction
by directing the committees of jurisdiction to report resolutions of approval or
disapproval:
Not later than forty-five days of continuous session of Congress after the
date of transmittal to the Congress of any submission of the President..., the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives, shall each submit
a report to its respective House on its views and recommendations
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9In the case of the Trade Act provisions governing implementing bills, there are time limits on
House and Senate committee consideration.  Most other expedited procedures impose time
limits on congressional consideration generally, including both committee and floor action in
one or both houses, as the case may be.
10Measures also can come to the House floor without having been reported from committee
by means of special rules, motions to suspend the rules, and unanimous consent requests.
(continued...)
respecting such Presidential submission together with a resolution...stating
in substance that the Congress approves or disapproves such submission,
as the case may be....
The reason for omitting a mandatory introduction requirement presumably is that
there is no need for either or both houses to invest time in acting on a measure under
expedited procedures if no Member is interested enough to introduce it voluntarily.
On the other hand, requiring introduction can assure that Congress has the maximum
time to consider and act on a measure under expedited procedures.  When the time
period available for congressional action under those procedures is triggered by an
event, such as receipt of a presidential message (as in the case just quoted), requiring
that  the measure be introduced on the same day or the first day of session thereafter
(as in the case of Section 151 of the Trade Act) leaves as much time as possible for
both houses and their committees to consider it.9 
Referral
Once a measure is introduced, it is to be referred to, and considered by, the
appropriate House committee or committees.  In the largest number of cases (roughly
40 percent of the total), expedited procedures provide for eligible measures to be
referred to committee in accordance with the House’s normal procedures.  In other
words, the Speaker is to refer these measures on the basis of committee jurisdictions
as defined in the House’s standing rules and as supplemented by well-established
referral precedents and practices.  In another one-quarter of the cases, the statutes are
silent on the matter of committee referral, which has the same effect: leaving the
measures in question to be referred by the same means and on the basis of the same
criteria applicable to all other bills and resolutions.  In roughly one-third of the cases,
however, fast-track procedures specifically identify the House (and often the Senate)
committees to which eligible measures are to be referred.  It is unlikely that these
differences would have practical consequences very often.
Committee Consideration
Among the most significant elements of expedited procedures are those
governing committee consideration.  Under the House’s regular procedures, its
committees usually can choose not to act on measures referred to them.  In such
cases, those measures are likely to die at the end of the Congress.  A majority of the
House can prevent this from happening by invoking a procedure by which it can vote
to discharge a committee from further consideration of a measure that was referred
to it.  However, this procedure can be time consuming, is not invoked very often, and
rarely has been used successfully.10  Thus, if expedited procedures do not prevent
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10(...continued)
However, none of these devices is likely to be used over the objections of the committee of
jurisdiction.
11The expedited procedures of the National Emergencies Act also are incorporated by
reference in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
committees from killing eligible measures by inaction, the procedures fail to ensure
the ability of a majority of the House to vote in a timely way on passing those
measures.
Roughly three-quarters of the expedited procedures in the House Rules and
Manual prevent committees from effectively killing eligible measures by failing to act
on them.  These procedures generally impose a deadline for committee action and
either require the committee to report the measure in question by that deadline or
provide a mechanism for the committee to be discharged if it fails to report in a timely
way.
The War Powers Act and the National Emergencies Act are unique in directing
the House committee of jurisdiction to report the measure in question within a
specified number of days (though not necessarily with a favorable recommendation)
and in presuming that the committee will comply with this requirement.11  For
example, Section 6 of the War Powers Act provides for certain measures to be
referred to the House Committee on International Relations (or the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations), and then directs that:
such committee shall report one such joint resolution or bill, together with
its commendations, not later than twenty-four calendar days before the
expiration of the sixty-day period . . . , unless such House shall otherwise
determine by the yeas and nays.
Both of these laws were enacted in the mid-1970s and are among the earliest
fast-track procedures that remain in force.  Many of the expedited procedures that
have been enacted since then impose similar time limits on committee action, but also
deal with a question that the War Powers and National Emergency Acts fail to
address.  What happens if the committee of jurisdiction does not report an eligible
measure within the time allowed for that committee to act?  Almost two-thirds (31
of 48) of the sets of expedited procedures anticipate this possibility by providing for
the committee of jurisdiction to be discharged without recourse to the difficult
discharge procedures of House Rule XV.
In nine instances, committee discharge is automatic.  If a committee fails to
report, within a specified number of days, an eligible measure that was referred to it,
that committee is automatically discharged from further consideration of the measure.
For example, Section 115 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 provides that:
Upon the expiration of 60 days of continuous session after the
introduction of the first resolution of repository siting approval with respect
to any site, each committee to which such resolution was referred shall be
discharged from further consideration of such resolution, and such
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resolution shall be referred to the appropriate calendar, unless such
resolution or an identical resolution was previously reported by each
committee to which it was referred.
A more common provision (found in 22 of the 48 sets of expedited procedures)
is to allow the House to decide by majority vote whether to discharge a committee
from further consideration of an eligible measure that the committee failed to report
within the time period allowed by law.  This motion may be nondebatable or it may
be debatable for an hour.  In either case, the motion is a privileged one, so that
Members supporting the measure are able to secure a vote on whether the committee
in question should be prevented from killing the measure by failing to report it.
What is perhaps more interesting is that more than one-quarter (13 of 48) of the
compiled expedited procedures do allow committee inaction to kill measures that
otherwise could receive fast-track consideration.  These sets of procedures do not
require the committee of jurisdiction to report an eligible measure that was referred
to it.  Furthermore, the same procedures do not include any provisions that enable a
majority of the House to remove that measure from the committee’s jurisdiction and
bring it to the floor for consideration.
For example, the Marine Fisheries Conservation Act defines an eligible measure
as one that contains certain provisions and is reported by what is now the House
Committee on Resources within 45 days after the House receives a certain document
from the President.  However, the statute does not direct the committee to report any
measure within that 45-day period.  Instead it simply provides that “[a]ny fishery
agreement resolution upon being reported shall immediately be placed on the
appropriate calendar.” (Italics added).  The statute provides no special means to take
such a resolution from the custody of the committee if the committee fails to report
it.  This omission creates the danger (or likelihood) that the resolution will die at the
end of the Congress without the full House having had an opportunity to vote on it.
Similarly, the Arms Export Control Act contains five identical sets of expedited
procedures for considering measures to prohibit various proposed actions by the
executive branch.  With respect to the House, these procedures state only that:
For the purpose of expediting the consideration and enactment of joint
resolutions under this subsection [or paragraph], a motion to proceed to the
consideration of any such joint resolution after it has been reported by the
appropriate committee shall be treated as highly privileged in the House of
Representatives.  (Italics added.)
If the committee fails to report such a joint resolution, that measure enjoys no
procedural advantage over other measures on which committees have not acted.
Thus, a key question to ask of any expedited procedures is whether or not they
give the full House an opportunity to vote on (or at least vote to consider) eligible
measures without regard to whether those measures are supported by the
committee(s) with jurisdiction over them.  More often than not, the expedited
procedures now in force provide this opportunity, but roughly one in four do not.
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12In some instances, this privileged motion is in order only after the committee of jurisdiction
has reported the measure.
13The expedited procedures for considering these resolutions are laid out in Section 115 of the
act.  Sections 135 and 146 of the same act  incorporate those procedures by reference and
make them applicable to other measures.
Priority for Floor Consideration
To ensure that the House has an opportunity to debate and vote on an eligible
measure, it is necessary but not sufficient for expedited procedures to prevent that
measure from being killed by committee inaction.  Those procedures also must make
it possible for the measure to reach the House floor after the committee has reported
it or has been discharged from considering it further.  
Most bills and resolutions that House committees report cannot simply be called
up on the floor for consideration at any time because those measures are not
privileged to interrupt the House’s regular daily order of business.  In practice,
measures reach the House floor either by unanimous consent or as privileged
interruptions of this order of business.  In turn, the most common way for measures
to become privileged is to be called up under special rules or as part of motions to
suspend the rules.  If expedited procedures do not give an eligible measure priority
access to the floor, that measure must rely on reaching the floor in one of these ways,
just like other reported bills and resolutions.  Consequently, there is a real possibility
that the House may not consider the measure at all, and an even greater danger that
the House may not act on it within the deadline imposed by law.
The War Powers Act and the National Emergencies Act again are unique in
providing that eligible measures reported from committee “shall become the pending
business of the House in question. . . .”  Instead, most fast-track procedures (39 of
48) authorize any Member to make a privileged motion to take up an eligible measure
that is no longer in the custody of a House committee.  In some cases, this motion
may be made as soon as the committee of jurisdiction has reported the measure or has
been discharged.  In others, a day or more must elapse before the motion is in order.
In some cases, the motion is not debatable; in others, it is debatable for an hour.
Whatever these minor differences may be, most expedited procedures enable the
House, by simple majority vote, to decide whether it wishes to act on an eligible
measure.12
The exceptions are the five sets of expedited procedures that do not provide for
calling up eligible measures on the House floor by majority vote.  In three of the five
cases, contained in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the committee of jurisdiction is
discharged automatically if it fails to report an eligible measure within a specified
number of days.  The act then goes on to provide that “[i]t shall be in order for the
Speaker to recognize a Member favoring a resolution to call up a resolution of
repository siting approval after it has been on the appropriate calendar for 5 legislative
days.”13  The Speaker is empowered to decide whether the House will consider such
a resolution; the House cannot decide by majority vote to call it up if the Speaker
does not arrange for its consideration.
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14The House or Senate may “otherwise determine by yeas and nays.”
15On the other hand, Section 152 of the Act (which also is incorporated by reference in Section
153) contains one but not both limits.  Section 152 limits the number of hours for House floor
(continued...)
The nuclear non-proliferation provisions of the Atomic Energy Act provide for
motions to consider certain measures but not others.  Section 130 of the act makes
in order privileged and nondebatable motions to consider certain concurrent
resolutions.  However, the same section includes different procedures for considering
certain joint resolutions.  Such a joint resolution is to be considered in the Senate
under the provisions of Section 601(b)(4) of the International Security Assistance and
Arms Export Control Act of 1976, which provides for a privileged motion to consider
a measure to which it applies.  But Section 130 does not apply these same provisions
to the House.  Instead, Section 130 states that:
For the purpose of expediting the consideration and passage of joint
resolutions reported or discharged pursuant to the provisions of this
subsection, it shall be in order for the Committee on Rules of the House
of Representatives to present for consideration a resolution of the House
of Representatives providing procedures for the immediate consideration
of a joint resolution under this subsection which may be similar, if
applicable, to the procedures set forth in section 601(b)(4) of the
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.
(Italics added.)
In effect, this provision states only that the House Rules Committee may (or may not)
do what it would be empowered to do anyway.  
House Floor Debate
Measures cannot be filibustered on the House floor.  In one way or another, the
House can, by majority vote, control how long it chooses to debate a bill or
resolution.  Nonetheless, expedited procedures that provide for calling up eligible
measures on the House floor typically go on to limit how long Members can debate
each of them.  With only a few exceptions, this limit takes the form of a maximum
number of hours that are to be available for debating a measure on the House floor.
The War Powers and National Emergencies Acts, on the other hand, provide that
eligible measures shall, when reported from committee, “become the pending
business” of the House (or Senate) and “shall be voted on within three calendar days
thereafter,” without establishing minimum or maximum times for debate during that
three-day period.14
Section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 contains both kinds of time limits.  That
section limits to not more than 20 hours the House floor debate on certain trade-
related bills and resolutions.  The same section also states that “[a] vote on final
passage of the bill or resolution shall be taken [on the House floor] on or before the
close of the 15th day after the bill or resolution is reported by the committee or
committees...to which it was referred, or after such committee or committees have
been discharged from further consideration of the bill or resolution.”15  
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debate on other resolutions, but it does not require that votes on final passage take place
within a specified number of days.
16Among the few exceptions are the fast-track procedures of the Marine Fisheries
Conservation Act and Title X of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (in
the case of rescission bills).
It bears emphasizing that, even if time limits on debate are not included in
expedited procedures, the House can, by majority vote, end debate on eligible
measures, either by agreeing to a motion to order the previous question or by
agreeing to a special rule that limits the time for general debate and the amending
process in Committee of the Whole.  Thus, the failure of some expedited procedures
to include time limits on debate does not necessarily mean that measures considered
under those procedures will be debated for longer than measures considered under
fast-track procedures that do include such time limits.
House Floor Amendments
Expedited procedures often are designed to do more than ensure that Members
of the House can vote within a limited time on passing eligible bills or resolutions.
These procedures often are intended to enable both houses of Congress to complete
the entire legislative process with respect to those measures within a fixed number of
days.
For this purpose, whether or not expedited procedures prohibit amendments to
eligible bills or resolutions is particularly important.  If a set of fast-track procedures
permits the House (or the Senate, or both) to amend an eligible measure on the floor,
those procedures cannot assure that both houses will be able to complete the
legislative process within a set time.  This remains true even if there are limits on floor
debate, ensuring that each house can vote promptly on whether to pass that measure,
and  even if majorities in both houses favor it.  Once either house amends any
measure, that action creates the likelihood of a legislative difference between the two
houses that may be resolved either through an exchange of amendments or through
negotiations in a conference committee.  There is no way in which any expedited
procedures can compel the House and Senate to reach an agreement by either means
within a certain time (or at all, for that matter).
Naturally, expedited procedures that neither provide for motions to take up
eligible measures on the House floor nor limit floor debate on them also do not
govern whether or not those measures are subject to floor amendments.  On the other
hand, fast-track procedures that limit floor debate on eligible bills and resolutions
almost always prohibit amendments to those measures as well.16 
When expedited procedures do explicitly permit House floor amendments, the
procedures typically impose narrow limits and strict definitions on the amendments
that Members may offer.  For example, Section 153 of the Trade Act of 1974 governs
House floor consideration of joint resolutions disapproving certain presidential
recommendations with respect to one or more countries.  Section 153 also bars floor
amendments to any such joint resolution, except that the prohibition “shall not apply
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House resolutions (or Senate resolutions), even though the effect of adopting those resolutions
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to any amendment to a resolution which is limited to striking out or inserting the
names of one or more countries or to striking out or inserting a with-respect-to
clause.”  
The only House floor amendments permitted under several other statutes are
those that reverse the effect of the measure that the House is considering.  Section
130 of the Atomic Energy Act governs congressional consideration of joint
resolutions by which Congress can either approve or disapprove certain presidential
submissions.  No floor amendments are in order, except that during consideration of
a joint resolution of approval, the majority leader or his designee can offer an
amendment to replace “does” with “does not”, thereby transforming the measure into
a joint resolution of disapproval.  In similar fashion, the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act governs House consideration of resolutions stating that the House
either “does not favor” or “does not object” to certain proposed energy actions.  The
only floor amendment permitted to such a resolution is an amendment in the nature
of a substitute that replaces the text of the resolution with the alternate text, thereby
reversing the measure’s effect.
Coordination with the Senate
Even when expedited procedures bar floor amendments in both houses to
concurrent or joint resolutions or to bills, they still may contain additional procedures
to coordinate action between the two houses.
To understand the potential problem these additional procedures address,
imagine a set of expedited procedures that provides maximum periods of time for
committee consideration and then for floor action in each house on a joint resolution
of disapproval.  Assume that the House passes H.J.Res. 1 under these procedures
shortly before the end of the period permitted by law for Congress to enact the joint
resolution with the benefit of expedited procedures.  If the Senate passes S.J.Res. 1
at about the same time, both houses will have passed identical resolutions, but the
two houses will not have passed the same resolution.  Therefore, the legislative
process remains incomplete.  When the House receives S.J.Res. 1 from the Senate,
there may not be enough time remaining for the House to use the fast-track
procedures to consider the Senate measure both in committee and on the House floor.
Most (35 of 48) sets of expedited procedures do not address this potential
problem.17  In nine instances, however, there are procedures providing that, if the
House receives a Senate joint or concurrent resolution before the House passes its
own corresponding measure, the House is to continue considering its own measure
but then is to vote instead on final passage of the Senate measure.  For example,
Section 115 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 provides in part:
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If the House receives from the Senate a resolution of repository siting
approval with respect to any site, then the following procedures shall apply:
(A) The resolution of the Senate with respect to such site shall
not be referred to a committee.
(B) With respect to the resolution of the House with respect
to such site–
(i) the procedure with respect to that or any other
resolutions of the House with respect to such site shall be the
same as if no resolution from the Senate with respect to such site
had been received; but
(ii) on any vote on final passage of a resolution of the
House with respect to such site, a resolution from the Senate
with respect to such site where the text is identical shall be
automatically substituted for the resolution of the House.
Only  the War Powers Act and the National Emergencies Act, enacted in the
1970s,18 include expedited procedures that attempt to deal with the potential delays
and procedural problems attributable to substantive differences between House and
Senate versions of the same measure.  The War Powers Act contains provisions very
similar to the following paragraph of the National Emergencies Act:
In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress
with respect to a joint resolution passed by both Houses, conferees shall be
promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a
report with respect to such joint resolution within six calendar days after
the day on which managers on the part of the Senate and the House have
been appointed.  Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the
printing of conference reports or concerning any delay in the consideration
of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than
six calendar days after the conference report is filed in the House in which
such report is filed first.  In the event the conferees are unable to agree
within forty-eight hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses
in disagreement.
The goal of this paragraph is to expedite appointment of conferees, deliberations
of the conference committee, and House and Senate floor consideration of the
resulting conference report.  However, these procedures leave many questions
unanswered.  For example, what constitutes prompt appointment of conferees, and
do these procedures in any way nullify Senators’ rights to debate the motions that the
Senate must adopt before it can appoint its conferees?  Furthermore, this paragraph
is silent on what is to happen if House and Senate conferees cannot reach an
agreement within 48 hours after being appointed and file a report in disagreement.
In other words, this paragraph demonstrates the difficulty–and ultimately, the
impossibility–of compelling the House and Senate to resolve a substantive policy
agreement, much less to do so quickly.
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(continued...)
Complete and Incomplete Procedures
One useful way to summarize this analysis is to distinguish between complete and
incomplete sets of expedited procedures.  As defined here, a complete set of
procedures ensures that, if an eligible bill or resolution enjoys majority support in both
houses, those majorities will be able to move the measure through the various stages
of the legislative process, in committee and on the floor, and present it to the
President within the time period permitted by the statute.
To meet these requirements, a complete set of expedited procedures:
1.  requires the committee (or committees) to which the measure is referred in
either house to report it within a fixed number of days or be discharged (either
automatically or by simple majority vote) from considering it further;
2.  allows the measure to be called up (again, either automatically or by simple
majority vote) for immediate or prompt floor consideration in both houses;
3.  limits the time available for debating the measure on the floor of either house;
4.  bars any amendments to the measure in either house; and
5.  includes the kind of provision, quoted above, for a final House vote on a
Senate measure (or a final Senate vote on a House measure).
To minimize uncertainty, it also is useful, though not essential, for the expedited
procedures to include the exact text (with blanks to be filled in) of the measures to
which the procedures are to apply.
If expedited procedures lack one or more of these provisions, they leave open
the possibility of delay in the legislative process that can prevent the process from
being completed within the time permitted by law.  Of course, that process can
continue to completion after the statutory time period elapses, but not with the benefit
of fast-track consideration.  Furthermore, most expedited procedures have been
enacted to facilitate congressional consideration of resolutions to disapprove
executive branch actions, which generally may take effect as soon as the stipulated
time period ends.  Thus, disapproving such an action at a later date involves the added
difficulty of requiring Congress to reverse or nullify some action that already has
taken place or some decision that already has begun to be implemented.
By these standards, most of the expedited procedures included in the House
Rules and Manual are incomplete.  Only 6 of the 48 sets of procedures in the Manual
include the last two of the five elements listed above: a total ban on amendments and
a mechanism to expedite House action on an eligible Senate measure.  If we set aside
the latter element as being useful but perhaps less essential than the other four,
roughly 30 percent (14 of 48) of the procedures qualify as complete.19
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authorize the Speaker to allow eligible measures to be brought up for floor action.
20This leaves open the possibility that the committee could report an eligible measure either
unfavorably or without recommendation.  However, a committee has little incentive to do so
unless it confronts the prospect of automatic discharge or discharge by majority vote if it fails
to report the measure at all.
Although most expedited procedures are incomplete by the criteria used here,
that does not necessarily mean that those procedures are defective.  Although it is
possible that some elements are missing from these procedures because of oversights
in drafting, it is more likely that these omissions represent intentional policy decisions.
For example, the House may decide deliberately to accord the same deference
to the judgments of its committees regarding measures eligible for fast-track
consideration as it does regarding all other measures.  If so, the House may provide
for an eligible measure to receive expedited consideration on the House floor only if
it has been reported by the committee to which it was referred.  As previously
discussed, for example, the Arms Export Control Act makes eligible measures
privileged for House floor action only after being reported by the appropriate
committee.20  The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of
1996 contains the same kind of provision.  Also as noted earlier, the Marine Fisheries
Conservation Act defines an eligible measure as one that has a stated effect and that
has been reported by the appropriate House (or Senate) committee.
In addition, concerns about the House’s floor schedule, as well as the agendas
of its committees, can lead the House to prefer sets of fast-track procedures that are
incomplete.  
Complete sets of expedited procedures can effectively force eligible measures
onto committees’ agendas, regardless of other demands on the committees’ time and
attention.  Procedures to discharge House committees, either automatically or by
majority vote if they fail to report eligible measures, give committees an incentive to
consider and report those measures, whether favorably or otherwise.  This incentive
is even greater if an eligible measure is given priority for House floor action, whether
the committee reported it or was discharged from considering it further.  If a
committee recognizes that the House may consider an eligible measure, regardless of
the committee’s opinion or action, the committee is likely to at least review the bill
or resolution carefully so that the committee and its members are prepared for the
floor debate on that measure. 
Furthermore, complete sets of fast-track procedures provide for the House to
consider each eligible measure on the floor at times that are largely beyond the control
of the majority party leadership.  The date on which an eligible measure can be called
up for floor consideration depends on three factors: (1) the date of the triggering
event, which usually is determined by the executive branch and which marks the start
of the period allowed for congressional action under the expedited procedures; (2) the
length of time permitted under the statute for committee action; and (3) when a
Member makes the privileged motion to call up the measure for House floor
consideration.
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Members have had to take positions on the issue.
The regular procedures of the House give the majority party leadership, acting
through the Speaker or the Rules Committee, dominant control over the House’s
floor schedule, in regard to both what measures the House considers and when it
considers them.  Complete expedited procedures can intrude substantially on that
authority and discretion.  Majority party leaders have little or no control over when
an eligible measure becomes available for floor action; and, in most cases, any
Member then can move that the House consider it.21
From the perspective of the majority party leadership, this diminution of its
control over the floor agenda may not be a significant problem if a set of expedited
procedures applies only to one bill or resolution.  On the other hand, consider the
potential impact of the 1996 law that established a mechanism for Congress to
disapprove a wide array of proposed federal regulations.  Because of the number of
regulations covered by this act, the process of acting on the corresponding joint
resolutions of disapproval could significantly intrude on the agendas of the House and
its committees, and on the capacity of the House’s majority party leaders, in
committee and on the floor, to manage those agendas.  Perhaps it was for this reason
that the 1996 law includes only very incomplete expedited procedures that do not
impose deadlines for committee action or provide for committee discharge, and that
do not give eligible measures priority access to the House floor for consideration.
There is a final point, mentioned at the beginning of this report, to consider when
evaluating the implications of expedited procedures for the House: these procedures
only have as much force and effect as the House chooses to give them at any moment.
As rule-making provisions enacted into law, fast-track procedures have as much
weight as the House’s standing rules, but no more. The House may decide at any time
to set aside certain expedited procedures, either temporarily or permanently.  Most
important, the Rules Committee always is free to report a special rule for considering
a measure on the House floor that supersedes the fast-track procedures under which
that measure otherwise could be considered.  The House then decides whether it
prefers to consider the measure under the statutory procedures or under the alternate
procedures recommended by its Rules Committee, in collaboration with its majority
party leaders.
Especially as they affect House floor action, therefore, expedited procedures are
procedures for the House to follow unless it prefers to adopt some other procedures
instead.  The variations in expedited procedures that the House has enacted into law
govern the House only to the extent that the House wishes to be governed by them.
